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ABSTRACT 
Recently philosophers have proposed a wide variety of interventions referred to as 
'moral enhancements'. Some of these interventions are concerned with helping 
individuals make more infonned decisions; others, however, are designed to com­
pel people to act as the intervener sees fit Somewhere between these flM) 
extremes lie interventions designed to direct an agent's attention either towards 
moraUy relevant issues-hat-hanging-or away from temptations to do wrong-hat­
hiding. I argue that these interventions fail to constitute genuine moral enhancement 
because, although they may result in more desirable outcomes - more altruism, 
more /aw-following, and/or less self-destructive behavior, they ignore a person's 
intentions, and often what makes an action right or wrong is the intent behind it. 
Sometimes people do the wrong thing. Recently philoso­
phers have proposed a variety of interventions designed to 
help people avoid doing the wrong thing: some propose cog­
nitive enhancement as a means of giving people the tools to 
make morally informed choices 1 and others propose forcing 
agents to act to bring about their desired outcomes.2 
1 F. Jo tterand. 'Vrrtue engineering' and moral agency: Will post humans still
need the virtue.5? AJOB Neuroscience 2011; 2(4): 3 9; J .A. Carter and E.C. 
Gordon. On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and 
Persson. Bioethics 2015; 29(3): 153 161; J. Harris(a). Moral Enhancement 
and Freedom. Bioethics 2011; 25(2): 102 111; J. Harris(b). 'Ethi� is for Bad 
Guys!' Putting the 'Moral' into Moral Enhancement. Bioethics 2013; 27(3): 
169 173; J. Harris(c). Moral Progress and Moral Enhancement Bioethics 
2013; 27(5): 285 290; J. Harris and J. Savule!eu. A Debate about Moral 
Enhancement. Cam Q Healthc Ethics 2015; 24(1): 8 22; 0. Lev. Enhancing 
the Capacity for Moral Agency. AJOB Neurosicence 2012; 3(4): 20 22; W 
Simkulet. On Moral Enhancement AJOB Neurosci 2012; 3(4): 17 18. 
2 D. DeGrazia Moral enhancement, freedom, and \Wt v.e (should) value in
moral behaviour. J Met/ Ethics 2014; 40(6): 361 368; T. Douglas Moral 
Enhancement J Appl Philos 200!; 25(3): 228 245; T. Douglas. Moral Enhance 
ment via Emotion Modulation: A Reply to Hanis. Bioethics 2013; 27(3): 1ro 
168; T. Douglas. Enhancing Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth. 
Neuroethics2014; 7(1): 75 91;T. Douglas TbeHarmsofEnhancementand the 
Conclusive Reasons View. Cam Q Healthc Ethics 2015; 24(1): 23 36; 1 Hughes. 
Moral Enhancement Requires Multiple Vtrtue.5 Cam Q Healthc Ethics 2015; 
24(1): 86 95; J. Savulescu & I. Persson. Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and the 
God Machine. Monist 2012; 9 5(3): 399 421; 1 Savule!eu& A. Sandberg. Neuro 
enhancement of Love and Maniage: Tbe Chemicals Between Us. Neuroethics 
200!; 1(1) 31 44; L Persson and 1 Savule!Cll Tbe Perils of Cognitive Enhance 
ment and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the MoralCharacterofH1UDanity. 
J App Philos 200!; 25(3): 162 177; lR Shoo. Neuroethi� and the possible types 
of moral enhancement AJOB Neurosci2012;3(4): 3 15. 
Raus et al. call interventions of the first kind 'capacities­
oriented'3 and they are consistent with what Harris Wise­
man calls a 'strong' conception of moral functioning ,4 while 
Raus et al. call interventions of the latter kind 'behavior­
oriented', concerned with outcomes and consistent with 
what Wiseman calls a 'minimal' conception of moral 
functioning. 
Each party refers to their proposed interventions as 
forms of 'moral enhancement', but in many of these cases 
the term is being applied too broadly. It would be absurd 
to say that any intervention to a person that results in 
desirable outcomes has morally enhanced that person. 
Consider the warlord who is on his way to bum down 
your village. You might intervene by offering him a regular 
bribe should he spare your village, resulting in the desirable 
outcome of your village being spared. Suppose the warlord 
takes you up on the offer and honors his agreement. Your 
village is spared a good outcome but it doesn't make 
sense to say that the warlord has been morally enhanced. 
Suppose we could obtain the same good outcome by giving 
the warlord a drug that made thoughts of sparing your vil­
lage appealing, or by implanting a device in his head that 
would put him to sleep whenever he though t about your 
3 K. Raus, F. Focquaert, M. Schermer, J. Specker, and S. Sterckx. On 
defining moral enhancement, a clarificatory taxonomy. Neuroethics 
2014; 7(3): 263 273. 
4 H. W iseman. Moral Enhancement 'Hard' and 'Soft' Forms. Am J 
Bioeth 2014; 14(4): 48 49. 
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village. These interventions, too, result in the same good
outcome, but fail to make the warlord a better person. If
anything, they make him a less successful warlord.
In some cases the interventions proposed by philoso-
phers do not enhance the subjects ability to engage in
moral behavior, but rather circumvent the ability. Con-
sider the God Machine proposed by Julian Savulescu
and Ingmar Persson, a machine that would have the
power to intervene whenever it detected that someone
made a free choice contrary to the ones approved of by
the machine; the machine would then edit the persons
mind so that she was causally determined to act in an
acceptable manner and so that she believed doing do was
her choice to begin with.5 Savulescue and Persson claim
the God Machine is not itself moral enhancement,6 yet
it meets the behavior-oriented account of moral enhance-
ment. Rather than improve the subjects moral character
or motivation, the God Machine circumvents her ability
to make decisions for herself. It has been argued that
interventions like these are not enhancement, but moral
compulsion, forcing others to act as one sees fit.7 Such
compulsion might be acceptable in some situations, -for
example restraining someone to prevent her from harm-
ing herself or others - but this doesnt seem like it should
fall under the guise of moral enhancement.
Two other forms of intervention are often proposed as
candidates for moral enhancement: (1) interventions that
prompt agents to pay attention to relevant moral issues,
what I call hat-hanging, and (2) interventions that reduce
the availability of prompts that might lead to immoral
behavior, what I call hat-hiding. Although such interven-
tions may result in desirable outcomes and dont face the
bevy of criticisms that trouble moral compulsion, here I
argue that hat-hanging and hat-hiding are not forms of
moral enhancement. Make no mistake; such interven-
tions are often morally acceptable, but they do not make
their targets better people.
This article is divided into three sections. In the first
section I construct a case of what I call hat-hanging, and
then define hat-hanging and hat-hiding. In the second
section I examine a variety of interventions philosophers
have proposed as forms of moral enhancement that are
cases of hat-hanging or hat-hiding. In the last section I
argue that hat-hanging and hat-hiding fail to constitute
genuine moral enhancement because they do not change
the agents intentions. An agents intentions play a large
part in determining whether her actions are morally right
or wrong independent of the outcomes of these actions,
and thus hat-hanging and hat-hiding do not influence an
agents moral character.
HANGING A HAT ON SOMETHING
One night Joness cousin dies tragically, and Jones 
believes that the right thing to do is to honor his cousin. 
Suppose that he has good reasons to believe that honor-
ing his cousin involves thinking about him often. James 
Rachels argues that acting morally is a matter of doing 
what one has the best reasons to do;8 as such Jones 
ought to think about his cousin often to honor him. 
Despite his believing he is morally obligated to think of 
his cousin, a week goes by and Jones does not think of 
him at all - until he receives a call about his cousins 
funeral. Panicked that he is failing his moral obligations, 
Jones brainstorms and comes up with a variety of meth-
ods to force himself to think of his cousin:
(1) Jones prints off photos of his cousin and hangs
them around his home on his refrigerator, next
to his alarm clock, above his television, etc. Every
morning as he wakes up, gets breakfast, and turns
on the news he is prompted to think of his cousin.
(2) Jones ties a string to his finger. Every time he noti-
ces the string, he is prompted to think of the string,
and often tries to remember why he tied it. When
he successfully remembers, he thinks of his cousin.
(3) Jones has a screen implanted in front of his left
eye that routinely displays pictures of his cousin.
Whenever a picture is displayed, he believes that
he will consciously or subconsciously think about
his cousin.
(4) Jones begins writing a novel about his cousins
life. A poor writer, Jones is confident that he will
need to revise the novel often, and each time he
does so he believes hell think of his cousin.
Jones believes these methods will cause him to think of
his cousin, which he believes will satisfy his moral obliga-
tion to honor his cousin. Each method seems to satisfy a
behavior-oriented conception of moral enhancement, but
although such interventions might lead to the kind of
behavior Jones wants to engage in, its not clear that
Jones becomes a better person by engaging in them.
These methods are instances of hanging a hat on
something, where an action is hat-hanging if and only if
it (1) draws attention to something and (2) depends on
that something to achieve a goal. When he employs each
of these methods, Jones intervenes in his normal life by
drawing his attention in such a way that he believes will
lead to the desired, morally required outcome: thinking
about his cousin. Furthermore, Jones depends upon
these interventions to bring about this outcome. Jones
doesnt try to think about his cousin on his own, instead5 Savulescu and Persson, op. cit. note 2.
6 Ibid.
7 Harris 2011, 2013a, 2013b; Harris and Savulescu 2015; Simkulet 2012,
op. cit. note 1.
8 J. Rachels. 2003. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. 4th edition. New
York:McGraw Hill.
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Bryony is wealthy and believes she ought to do more
to help the poor. Although she occasionally does
something to help, she is generally unsympathetic to
the poor. To help change her behavior, she sets up
her television to display graphic images of the effects
of poverty for brief periods that she does not con-
sciously recognize, but that cause her subliminally to
increase her feelings of sympathy to the poor. These
increased feelings of sympathy prompt her to donate
more money to charity.10
Were told Bryony believes that she ought to do more to
help the poor. She is wealthy and has the means to help
the poor. Yet she fails to do this, seemingly because of a
weakness of will. For Douglas, Bryony doesnt have any
psychological or physical impediments to doing the right
thing; she is not depressed, easily distracted, psycho-
pathic, too physically exhausted to act, etc. Bryony
knows that she has a moral obligation that shes inexpli-
cably unwilling to decide to fulfill on her own, so she
hangs her hat on a plan to circumvent her otherwise nor-
mal decision making method, jury-rigging herself into
doing what she, by stipulation, already believes is
morally required of her.
Similarly, Julian Savulescu and John Harris discuss the
possibility of interventions that would raise an agents
empathy11 and John Shook has proposed raising an
agents thoughtfulness about doing moral things and/or
raising a persons sensitivity to the moral features of sit-
uations.12 Such interventions are designed to get the
agents to do the right thing solely by drawing their atten-
tion to the thing that needs to be done.
Many philosophers also support hat-hiding interven-
tions. A number of philosophers talk about chemical
castration or hormonal castration as a means of pre-
venting future sexual misbehavior by suppressing or
removing a subjects sexual impulses.13
Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson propose a bio-
medical intervention that could reduce discrimination
based on race.14 They contend that people automatically
and necessarily catalog the race of each person they
encounter, but that if an intervention could suppress this
cataloging, then people would simply not be given the
opportunity to discriminate based on race. Thomas
Douglas imagines a similar case, in which a doctor,
Andrew, who discriminates against his patients based on
race takes steps to treat his patients equally by suppress-
ing the neural connections associated with his racism.15
he relies upon these methods to cause him to think of his 
cousin without any further effort on his part.
Jones actions here are not alien; most of us engage in 
instances of hat-hanging quite regularly. For example, 
many of us set an alarm clock to wake us in the morning 
knowing full well that if the alarm clock somehow failed 
to ring at the appropriate time, we might fail to wake. 
The alarm clocks ringing draws our attention to the 
time and prompts us to start our day, and many of us 
depend upon it.
While hat-hanging involves drawing our attention to 
something, hat-hiding involves (1) drawing attention 
away from something and (2) depending on this sub-
verted attention to achieve a goal. Hat-hiding, too, can 
result in improved behavior. Someone trying to lose 
weight might hide their fatty foods, thinking out of 
sight, out of mind. This behavior doesnt make it impos-
sible for the person to eat fatty foods, it just reduces their 
opportunities to be tempted, making it less likely they 
will eat fatty foods.
Both hat-hanging and hat-hiding involve changing the 
number of prompts one has with a goal of leading to 
more desirable behavior, but when one engages in these 
actions they often rely upon the addition or removal of 
prompts to do the moral work and produce the more 
desirable outcomes. Neither hat-hanging or hat-hiding 
strengthen a persons will do the right thing. The appeal 
of such methods is that once they have been set up, they 
relieve the agent of having to do anything else. The hat-
hanging or hat-hiding will typically cause them to behave 
more desirably without additional effort on their part.
One could argue that some instances of hat-hanging 
and hat-hiding are instrumentally valuable insofar as 
they train the person to become a better person. For 
example, if you set your alarm clock to 6am every day, 
eventually you might condition yourself to wake up at 
6am without the alarm. However, if your only goal in 
setting your alarm is to make sure that you wake up on 
time, the conditioning is accidental. The person who 
hangs his hat on his alarm to wake himself believes that 
if the power goes out, he will not be awoken. If he has 
unwittingly conditioned himself to wake at 6am, and 
power goes out, he will still wake up on time but this is 
a happy accident and unintentional.
INTERVENTIONS
A number of philosophers have proposed interventions 
that fall under the category of hat-hanging. Thomas 
Douglas contends moral enhancement is any interven-
tion expected to leave the individual with morally better 
motives or behavior,9 and proposes the following case 
that satisfies the latter part of this description:
9 Douglas 2014, op. cit. note 2.
10 Adapted fromDouglas, op. cit. note 2, Harris 2013, op. cit. note 1.
11 Harris and Savulescu, op. cit. note 1.
12 Shook, op. cit. note 2.
13 Harris and Savulescu, op. cit. note 1, Douglas 2015, Savulescue and
Sandberg, op. cit. note 2.
14 Savulescu and Persson, op. cit., note 2.
15 Ibid.
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James Hughes notes that bariatric surgery is the most
effective form of weight control, and that drugs and
devices that suppress appetite might be similarly effec-
tive.16 Insofar as we have a moral obligation to stay
healthy, this kind of hat-hiding seems to satisfy behavior-
oriented accounts of moral enhancement. Thomas
Douglas suggests that moral enhancement might consist
of suppressing counter-moral emotions: emotions that
interfere with moral reasoning, sympathy, and all other
plausible candidates for morally good motives.17 John
Doris suggests that we might modify our social institu-
tions to avoid temptation, thus reducing people acting
on said temptation.18 Similarly Neil Levy advocates com-
bating cognitive biases by implementing social policies to
shape our environments to dampen our cognitive weak-
nesses and increase our cognitive strengths.19
The key feature of each of these interventions is that
they are designed to bring about desirable outcomes by
either increasing prompts associated with good behavior,
or decreasing prompts associated with bad behavior.
Such interventions might be morally acceptable, but they
dont seem to constitute genuine moral enhancement.
This is to say that the people involved do not become
better people as a result; their flaws persist but are just
less obvious and less impactful.
Bryony suffers from akrasia, or weakness of will; she
believes she has a strong moral obligation to help the
poor and has every opportunity to do so. . . but she sim-
ply chooses not to act in the way she believes is right.
She doesnt choose to do more to help the poor. How-
ever, she does choose to do something. She takes steps to
make it more likely that she will help the poor in the
future. She is prima facie praiseworthy for taking
the steps that she believes are necessary to get her to do
the right thing, in this case through subliminal condition-
ing, but this ignores the larger problem. Even after her
intervention, she can still (1) know what the right thing
to do is, and yet (2) not do it.
Similarly, while interventions designed to raise peoples
empathy or thoughtfulness about moral matters may
result in said people acting in more morally desirable
ways, it seems that they, like Bryony, are still akratic
moral agents, unwilling to do the right thing unless they
are constantly reminded. Like Bryony they do not do the
right thing for the right reason; rather they might be
inclined to do the right thing more often because theyre
prompted more often than others.
Cases of hat-hiding further seem to circumvent ones
normal moral decision making method. In fact,
16 Hughes, op. cit. note 2.
17 Douglas, 2013, op. cit. note 2, p. 161.
18 J.M. Doris. 2002. Lack of character: Personality and Moral Behavior.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19 N. Levy. Ecological engineering: Reshaping our environments to
achieve our goals.Philosophy & Technology 2012; 25(4): 1 16.
advocates of such interventions seem to accept that their 
subjects can tell the difference between right and wrong, 
but that this alone isnt sufficient to get them to act 
rightly. Instead, they seek to remove the agents opportu-
nity to act wrongly. After all, one cant give in to tempta-
tion if ones not tempted. Sex offenders are given drugs 
to remove or suppress the temptation to sexually assault 
others; people who eat too much are given surgery and/
or drugs to control their weight because it is easier and 
more effective than relying upon them to fight their crav-
ings; Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson propose drugs 
that would suppress an agents ability to recognize the 
race of others, lest he be tempted to treat them unequally. 
Such interventions wouldnt enhance people morally; 
they just reduce bad outcomes and make those agents 
less obviously immoral. The chemically castrated sex 
offender, by assumption, is willing to sexually assault 
others if he feels like it; the person who underwent sur-
gery is willing to eat more if he wasnt full; and the racist 
is still willing to let arbitrary traits he recognizes about 
others lead to preferential treatment if he takes note of 
such a trait. A sufficiently disinterested observer would 
be unable to tell the difference between a successfully 
medicated sex offender neighbor who refrains from sexu-
ally assaulting others and a neighbor that refrains from 
sexually assaulting others because she recognizes that 
such behavior, while biologically possible for her, would 
be morally horrible; despite this it is clear that there is a 
substantive moral difference between these neighbors. 
Much like shackles, hat-hiding interventions takes away 
opportunities an agent has to act immorally, but they 
dont make the person better. Such people are still 
threats to themselves and/or others given the chance.
NO SHORTCUTS
What is striking about the cases of Jones and Bryony is 
that both protagonists take it upon themselves to reject 
their normal way of making decisions which, they 
believe, have lead them to act immorally. Jones prompts 
himself to think of his cousin, while Bryony prompts her 
subconscious to think about the poor. Both cases seem 
to be instances of what Eddy Nahmias calls bypassing, 
the circumventing of normal moral deliberation proc-
esses in such a way that he contends would undermine 
the agents normal moral responsibility for their 
actions.20 Of course in these cases Jones and Bryony are 
not merely puppets, but also the puppeteers, so it makes
20 E. Nahmias, 2011. Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and 
Bypassing. in R. Kane, (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will 2nd Ed. 
Oxford University Press: 555 587; E. Nahmias, E. 2014. Is Free Will an 
Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences. In 
Moral Psychology, vol. 4, Free Will and Moral Responsibility. W. Sinnott 
Armstrong, Cambridge, MA; MIT Press: 1 25.
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sense to say that they are responsible for their free
choices to pursue such interventions, but not what
follows.
Jones and Bryony are uncontroversially morally
responsible for their free choices to engage in hat-
hanging; but is this behavior praiseworthy or blamewor-
thy? If an agent has a moral obligation to perform some
action x and there is some other action y that is neces-
sary, but not sufficient for that agent performing x, then
doing y as a step to perform x is praiseworthy.21 Both
Jones and Bryony use hat-hanging as a step to do the
right thing, but is it a necessary step? I think most of us
would say no, that Jones is free to do what he thinks is
right, to think about his cousin; and that Bryony is free
to do what she thinks is right, act to benefit the poor. If
they are free to do the right thing with no preparations,
then hat-hanging is not necessary to bring about the
desired results. As such, why would Jones and Bryony
choose to jump through hoops to bring it about that
they act morally in the future rather than just freely act
to immediately bring about the same result?
In both cases Jones and Bryony are relying upon hat-
hanging to causally determine them to do the right thing
in the future, rather than freely choosing to do the right
thing at the moment. At the very least this delaying of
right action until the future is prima facie morally wrong.
After all, Bryony could be out there helping the homeless
now rather than MacGyvering her television to program
herself to help the homeless in the future.
Although helping the poor is time-sensitive (better
done sooner than later), Joness moral obligation to
honor his cousin doesnt seem to be. As such, one might
be inclined to say that Joness hat-hanging that causes
him to think about his cousin is morally comparable to
thinking about his cousin immediately. Furthermore, one
could argue that by taking steps to make sure that he
thinks of his cousin in the future, he is actually thinking
about his cousin in the present, living up to his moral
obligations. This, I think, is a mistake; resting upon an
equivocation between (1) the action of thinking about
Joness cousin, and (2) Joness moral obligation to think
about his cousin to honor him. Jones believes that he
ought to think about his cousin with the intent to honor
him, but his hat-hanging only inadvertently involves
thinking about his cousin; he doesnt think about his
cousin to honor him, but rather he incidentally thinks
about his cousin while he sets up prompts to cause him
to think about his cousin in the future. What, then,
about his future cousin-thinking, prompted by the pho-
tos he hung around the house, the string on his finger,
the computer screen in his eye, and/or the novel he is
writing? Although hes thinking about his cousin, hes
doing so for the wrong reason. Hes not thinking of his
cousin to honor him, hes thinking about his cousin
because he set up a complex series of Rube Goldberg
machines designed to prompt him to think about his
cousin.
The same can be said for Bryony, shes not helping the
poor because she believes she has a moral obligation to
do so, shes helping the poor because she tricked herself
into subconsciously feeling enough sympathy for the
poor to get her to open her checkbook. She might just
as easily trick herself into subconsciously feeling enough
sympathy for unsuccessful, device-affected warlords to
get her to open her checkbook so that they might get the
troublesome devices removed so they can go back to
sacking villages. For Jones, believing that his cousin is
worthy of thinking about is not sufficient to get him to
think about him, and for Bryony knowing that there are
others who are in desperate need of help that she can
provide is not enough to get her to help them. Both have
a conception of what the right thing to do is, yet frustrat-
ingly fail to freely choose to do that thing, and instead
freely take a shortcut designed to bring about an out-
come that they are said to believe to be desirable. Yet in
doing so, I contend, that they fail to do the right thing,
because the right thing to do in any given situation is to
do the thing you have the best reasons to do for those
reasons.
Consider the following cases:
Hostage 1: Officer John arrives to find a violent,
escaped criminal holding a hostage. He believes the
hostages life is in danger and shoots the criminal to
save the hostage. He succeeds, the criminal dies, and
the hostage is safe.
Hostage 2: Officer Joan arrives to find a violent,
escaped criminal holding a hostage. She believes the
hostages life is in danger. As it so happens, Joan
likes killing people and takes this opportunity to sat-
isfy her bloodlust, knowing that her shooting of the
criminal will appear like normal, responsible police
work. She succeeds, the criminal dies, and the hos-
tage is safe.22
Although both John and Joan act in the same way, they
do so with different intentions. Johns intentions are
prima facie praiseworthy, while Joans intentions are
prima facie blameworthy. John does the right thing for
the right reason, while Joan does the right thing for the
wrong reason. As such, it makes sense to say that Joan
acted immorally.
One might object to this position, contending that all
that matters are the consequences of an action; in both
21 W. Simkulet. On Robust Alternate Possibilities and the Tax Evasion
Case. Southwest Philosophy Review 2015; 31(1), 101 107.
22 Adapted fromW. Simkulet. TheDeontic Cycling Problem.Philosoph
ical Analysis 2014; 31: 49 64.
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of the above cases, the hostage is saved, so might we be
inclined to say that both John and Joan have acted
morally? I think not; suppose that both John and Jane
were to accidentally post excepts from their personal
journals online; with Johns saying Today I had to shoot
an escaped criminal to save a hostage. It wasnt fun, but
I had to do it, and Joans saying Today I had the
opportunity to shoot somebody. It was fun, I hope that
more criminals escape and take hostages so that I can
shoot them and get away with it. I suspect many people
would still say Johns shooting was praiseworthy, but few
would say that Joans act was praiseworthy. Can we con-
demn Joan while still concluding that her action was
morally praiseworthy? Again, I think not. Only moral
agents can be morally responsible; actions themselves are
neither praiseworthy or blameworthy. Of course we can
conclude that Joans action had good consequences and
be happy that she took that action; but certainly we
would much prefer that she was the sort of person who
would act for better reasons. If Joan is the sort of person
who kills when she can get away with it, shes the sort of
person who would kill us if she could get away with it.
As with Joan, it makes sense to say that Jones and
Bryony do the right thing for the wrong reasons. Rather
than do what they recognize is morally right, Jones and
Bryony attempt to bypass their own decision making
processes to bring about the desired consequences.
Observers might think that Bryonys actions are moral in
the same way that the hostage might think Joans actions
were praiseworthy, but this is not the case.
Both Jones and Bryony had better options available.
Instead of hat-hanging, they could have just chosen to
do the right thing. Instead they chose to do the next best
thing, tricking themselves into doing the right thing for
the wrong reasons. This option is probably morally supe-
rior to complete inaction, but this freely choosing to do
the second best option still constitutes a moral failing.
Similarly, the other instances of hat-hanging and hat-
hiding discussed in the last section seem to suffer from
the same problem; they result in desirable outcomes with
little to no effort from the subjects involved. Such inter-
ventions dont make them better people, they just rob
them of some of their opportunities to act immorally.
They key word here, of course, is some, as the agents
involved are still apt to fail moral challenges. Unfortu-
nately, we are rarely in the position to tell the difference
between someone who is genuinely a good person, and
someone whose machinations have caused her to act in a
way that appears identical to the way a good person
would act.
Moral failing or not, does hat-hanging and/or hat-hiding
constitute genuine moral enhancement? Hat-hanging,
and hat-hiding alike would satisfy behavior-oriented con-
ceptions of moral enhancements, but then again so would
the God machine and implanting the warlord with a chip
that makes him fall asleep when he thinks about sacking
your village. It doesnt make sense to call these interven-
tions moral enhancement.
Only moral agents can be morally responsible, and
they can only be responsible for things inside of their
control. Hat-hanging, hat-hiding, and the like remove an
agents control over what they do, bypassing the normal
free choices that most of us believe are within our con-
trol. In light of this, it seems that we should reject the
behavior-oriented account in favor of the capacities-
oriented account. As interventions designed to force an
agent to act as the intervener desires would undermine
agency and responsibility, the only interventions that
could reasonably be called moral enhancement would be
interventions that enhance cognitive capacities in a way
that would allow to them make morally better choices.
For example, education may allow an agent to make
more informed choices, and more informed choices are
more likely to bring about the desired results. An edu-
cated moral agent who acts morally will have a greater
chance at bringing about their desired result than an
uneducated moral agent. By stipulation, the educated
and uneducated moral agents who both do what they
have the most reasons to do are morally praiseworthy;
the difference that moral enhancement makes is not in
how praiseworthy they are, but rather in how successful
they are. All else being equal, the educated moral agent
is more likely to bring about his morally desired out-
comes than the uneducated moral agent. Both capacities-
oriented and behavior-oriented accounts of moral
enhancement are designed to lead to morally desirable
outcomes; the relevant difference is that while behavior-
oriented interventions do not concern themselves with
bettering the agent, often merely bypassing the agent,
capacities-oriented interventions do better the agent,
making them more successful moral agents.
Consider two former warlords, the first implanted with
a device that bypasses his free will and compels him to
volunteer his time helping the homeless, and the second
who took to reading philosophy and concluded that he
would be happier, healthier, wealthier, and safer if he
devoted his resources to improving his country rather
than destroying it. Neither raid villages anymore. The
difference, however, is that only the latter acts as a moral
agent. Of course, the latter can still freely choose to go
against his interests and raid villages; but all this is to
say that he still has what George Harris calls the freedom
to fall, or freedom to morally fail.23
In addition to education, it is possible that there are
some biological interventions that may also count as
moral enhancement; for example tools to help an agent
say alert or focused may count as moral enhancement, as
23 Harris 2011, op. cit. note 1, p. 103.
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would interventions designed to improve an agents
memory, cognitive abilities, or senses.
CONCLUSION
Here Ive argued that hat-hanging and hat-hiding do not
constitute genuine moral enhancement, where moral
enhancement is concerned with giving individuals tools
needed to better achieve their goals. The right thing to
do is to do what one has the best reasons to do for those
reasons; moral enhancement is any intervention that
allows an agent to better evaluate reasons, and/or better
achieve their goals. Although hat-hanging and hat-hiding
do not constitute genuine moral enhancement, there are
many situations in which such actions are morally
acceptable, even morally obligatory. After all, it would be
quite absurd to conclude that setting ones alarm clock is
immoral. . . just as it would be quite absurd to conclude
that setting ones alarm clock is moral enhancement and
makes one a better person.
But this is not merely a matter of semantics; acts of
hat-hanging and hat-hiding often bypass an agents nor-
mal deliberation process, undermining their moral
responsibility and robbing them of the freedom to choose
how to live their lives. Although individuals such as Jones
and Bryony should have the freedom to freely choose to 
undermine their own freedoms, it is prima facie morally 
undesirable to rob another of the ability to make their 
own free choices. The taking away of an agents free will 
is one of the greatest harms that can befall a person 
think of the harm done to a prisoner sentenced to life in 
prison for a crime she did not commit, or a victim kept 
in a medically induced coma by a medically savvy kidnap-
per (the latter autonomy violation is more severe than the 
former, as it robs the agent of more of their autonomy; 
although the former comes with additional challenges). 
Those who advocate hat-hanging or hat-hiding interven-
tions be performed on others against their will would 
have to show two things (1) that the benefits of such 
interventions outweigh harm, and (2) that the performing 
the interventions do not violate the agents rights.
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